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Abstract
The display advertising industry has recently transitioned from second- to first-price auctions
as its primary mechanism for ad allocation and pricing. In light of this, publishers need to
re-evaluate and optimize their auction parameters, notably reserve prices. In this paper, we
propose a gradient-based algorithm to adaptively update and optimize reserve prices based on
estimates of bidders’ responsiveness to experimental shocks in reserves. Our key innovation is
to draw on the inherent structure of the revenue objective in order to reduce the variance of
gradient estimates and improve convergence rates in both theory and practice. We show that
revenue in a first-price auction can be usefully decomposed into a demand component and a
bidding component, and introduce techniques to reduce the variance of each component. We
characterize the bias-variance trade-offs of these techniques and validate the performance of our
proposed algorithm through experiments on synthetic data and real display ad auctions data
from Google ad exchange.
1 Introduction
A reserve price in an auction specifies a minimum acceptable winning bid, below which the item
remains with the seller. The reserve price may correspond to some outside offer, or the value of
the item to the seller itself, and more generally may be set to maximize expected revenue [25].
In a data-rich environment like online advertising auctions it becomes possible to learn a revenue-
optimal reserve price over time, and there is a substantial literature on optimizing reserve prices
for second-price auctions, which have been commonly used to allocate ad space [27, 23, 24].
In this work we examine the problem of reserve price optimization in first-price (i.e., pay-your-
bid) auctions, motivated by the fact that all the major ad exchanges have recently transitioned to
this auction format as their main ad allocation mechanism [10, 6]. First-price auctions have grown
in favor because they are considered more transparent, in the sense that there is no uncertainty
in the final price upon winning [5].1 Unless restrictive assumptions are met, there is in theory no
revenue ranking between first- and second-price auctions [19], and there is no guarantee that reserve
prices optimized for second-price auctions will continue to be effective in a first-price setting.
∗Supported by a NSF award CCF-1841550 and a Google PhD Fellowship. This work was partly done when the
first author was an intern in Google Inc, NYC.
1The full reasons for the transition are complex, and include the rise of “header bidding” [30]. A header bidding
auction is a first-price auction usually triggered by code in a webpage header (hence the name).
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From a learning standpoint the shift from second- to first-price auctions introduces several new
challenges. In a second-price auction, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy no matter what the
reserve. The bidders’ value distributions are therefore readily available, and bids stay static (in
principle) as the reserve is varied. In a first-price auction, in contrast, bidders have an incentive to
shade their values when placing their bids, and bid-shading strategies can vary by bidder. The gain
from setting a reserve price now comes if (and only if) it induces higher bidding, so an understanding
of bidder responsiveness becomes crucial to setting effective reserves.
Bid adjustments in response to a reserve price can occur at different timescales. If a bidder
observes that it wins too few auctions because of the reserve price, it may increase its bid in the
long-term (in a matter of hours up to weeks). Our focus here is on setting reserves prices by taking
into account immediate bidder responses to reserves. We assume that each bidder has a fixed,
unknown bidding function b(r, v) that depends on its private value v and the observed auction
reserve r. This agrees with practice in display ad auctions because the reserve r is normally sent
out in the ’bid request’ message to potential bidders [18]. To the extent that the bid function
responds to r, first-price reserves can potentially show an immediate positive effect on revenue.
Our Results
We propose a gradient-based approach to adaptively improve and optimize reserve prices, where
we perturb current reserves upwards and downwards (e.g., by 10%) on random slices of traffic to
obtain gradient estimates.
Our key innovation is to draw on the inherent structure of the revenue objective in order
to reduce the variance of gradient estimates and improve convergence rates in both theory (e.g.,
see Corollary 4.1) and practice. We show that revenue in a first-price auction can be usefully
decomposed into two terms: a demand curve component which depends only on the bidder’s value
distribution; and a bidding component whose variance can be reduced based on natural assumptions
on bidding functions.
A demand curve is a simpler, more structured object than the original revenue objective (e.g.,
it is downward-sloping), so the demand component lends itself to parametric modeling to reduce
the variance. We offer two variance reduction techniques for the bidding component2, referred to
as bid truncation and quantile truncation. Bid truncation can strictly decrease variance with no
additional bias assuming the right bidding model, whereas quantile truncation may introduce bias
but is less sensitive to assumptions on the bidding model.
We evaluate our approach over synthetic data where bidder values are drawn uniformly, and also
over real bid distributions collected from the logs of the Google ad exchange with different bidder
response models. Our experimental results confirm that the combination of variance reduction on
both objective components leads to the fastest convergence rate. For the demand component, a
simple logistic model works well over the synthetic (i.e., uniform) data, but a flexible neural net is
needed over the semi-synthetic data. For the bidding component, we find that quantile truncation
is much more robust to assumptions on the bidding model.
Related Work
This paper connects with the rich literature on reserve price optimization for auctions, e.g., [25, 29].
How to set optimal reserve prices in second price auctions based on access to bidders’ historical
bid data has been an increasingly popular research direction in Machine Learning community,
e.g., [26, 23, 24]. Another related line of work uses no-regret learning in second price auctions with
2Variance reduction of the bidding component relies on the insight that bids far above the reserves are little affected
by them (under natural bidding models), so these bids can be filtered out when computing gradient estimates—changes
in such bids are likely due to noise rather than any effect of reserves.
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partial information feedback to optimize reserve prices, e.g., [7, 9]. All of the works cited so far
rely on the fact that the seller can directly learn the valuation distribution from historical bid data,
since the second price auction is truthful.
For first-price auctions, we have found little work on setting optimal reserves for asymmetric
bidders, since there are no characterizations of equilibrium strategies for this case. Results are only
available for limited environments, such as bidders with uniform valuation distributions [19, 22].
Recently, there has been a line of work regarding revenue optimization against strategic bidders
in repeated auctions, e.g., [3, 17]. In this paper, instead of assuming bidders act strategically,
we assume each bidder has a fixed bidding function in response to reserves. This is a common
assumption in large market settings and in the dynamic pricing literature [21].
The algorithms developed in this paper are related to the literature on online convex optimiza-
tion with bandit feedback [11, 16, 1, 2]. However, there are two key differences with our work: (1)
the revenue function in a first price auction is non-convex, and (2) the seller cannot obtain perfect
revenue feedback under perturbed reserves with just a single query (i.e., auction)—the seller needs
multiple queries to achieve accurate estimates with high confidence. Our algorithm is also related to
zeroth-order stochastic gradient methods [14, 4, 13, 20], which we discuss in detail later in Section 3.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a setting where a seller repeatedly sells a single item to a set of m bidders via a first
price auction. In such an auction, the seller first sends out a reserve price r to all bidders. Each
bidder i then submits a bid bi. The bidder with the highest bid larger than r wins the item and
pays their bid; if no bidder bids above r, the item goes unallocated. Note that the type of reserve
price we consider in this work is anonymous in the sense that each bidder sees the same reserve
price.
Each bidder i has a private valuation vi ∈ [0, 1] for the item, where each value vi is drawn
independently (but not necessarily identically) from some unknown distribution.3 In a first-price
auction, only the highest bid matters for both allocation and pricing. Thus, to simplify the nota-
tion, we write v = maxi vi to denote the maximum value and v is drawn i.i.d. from an unknown
distribution F across each auction. Our analysis from here on will refer to this ‘representative’
highest bidder. (See Appendix A for a rigorous justification of why we can reduce multiple bidders
to a single bidder.)
We write b(r, v) to denote the maximum bid when the reserve price is r and the maximum value
is v, and B(r) to denote the distribution of b(r, v) for a fixed r when v is drawn according to F .
The main goal of the seller considered in this work is to learn the optimal reserve price r ∈ [0, 1]
that maximizes expected revenue:
Ev∼F [b(r, v) · I{b(r, v) ≥ r}] . (1)
Note that there is no reason for a bidder to bid a positive value less than the reserve r: such a bid
is guaranteed to lose. Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume that if b(r, v) < r, then
b(r, v) = 0. This allows us to write the revenue simply as:
µ(r) = Eb∼B(r) [b] = Ev∼F [b(r, v)] .
In this paper, we focus on maximizing the revenue function µ(r) in the steady state.
3This is without loss of generality, our analysis can easily be applied to any bounded valuation setting.
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Response Models
We begin by describing some general properties of bidding functions that hold for any utility-
maximizing bidders (see [22] for further discussion).
Definition 2.1. A bidding function b(r, v) satisfies the following properties: 1) b(r, v) ≤ v for all
v; 2) b(r, v) ≥ r for v ≥ r; 3) b(r, v) = 0 for v < r; 4) b(r, v) is non-decreasing in v for all r.
In some of our algorithms, we would like to impose additional constraints on the response model
which, while not a consequence of utility-maximizing behavior, are likely to hold in practice. One
such constraint is the diminishing sensitivity in value of bid to reserve. This says that bidders with
a larger value will change their bid less in response to a change in reserves.
Definition 2.2 (Diminishing sensitivity of bid to reserve). If vH > vL ≥ r, then for δ > 0 we have
b(r + δ, vH)− b(r, vH) ≤ b(r + δ, vL)− b(r, vL).
One natural and concrete example of a response model is a bidder that increases its bid to the
reserve as long as the reserve is below its value. We refer to this as the perfect response model,
formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. A perfect response bidding function takes the form:
b(r, v) =

b(0, v) if b(0, v) ≥ r
r if b(0, v) < r ≤ v
0 if v < r
Note that the perfect response model is based on the original bid of the bidder under reserve price 0,
namely b(0, v). If b(0, v) is already above the reserve, then this bidder is unaffected by the reserve.
Note that the perfect response model satisfies the diminishing sensitivity property.
In practice, bidders are unlikely to exactly follow the perfect response model; for example,
bidders will often increase their bid to some amount strictly above the reserve r so as to remain
competitive with other bidders. For this reason, we propose a relaxation of the perfect response
model which we call the ε-bounded response model : the bid is at most ε greater than what it would
have been under the perfect response model if b(0, v) < r ≤ v (see also Definition C.6). Note that
the ε-bounded response model becomes the perfect response model when ε = 0.
3 Gradient Descent Framework
The first-price auction setting introduces several challenges for setting reserve prices. First, the
seller cannot observe true bidder values because truthful bidding is not a dominant strategy in
a first-price auction. Second, how the bidders will react to different reserves is unknown to the
seller—the only information that the seller receives is bids drawn from distribution B(r) when the
seller sets a reserve price r.
One natural idea, and the approach we take in this paper, is to optimize the reserve price via
gradient descent. Gradient descent is only guaranteed to converge to the optimal reserve when
our objective is convex (or at least, unimodal), which is not necessarily true for an arbitrary
revenue function. However, gradient descent has a number of practical advantages for reserve price
optimization, including:
1. Gradient descent allows us to incorporate prior information we may have about the location
of a good reserve price (possibly significantly reducing the overall search cost).
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Algorithm 1 Zeroth-order stochastic projected gradient framework for reserve optimization.
Input: Initial reserve r1 ∈ (0, 1), total number of iterations T (a variable to be fixed later).
Output: Reserve prices r2, r3, . . . , rT+1.
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Set a reserve price of r+t = (1 + βt)rt in nt auctions.
Set a reserve price of r−t = (1− βt)rt in nt auctions.
Construct an estimate Gˆt of the gradient of revenue at rt, based on the feedback of experiments.
Update reserve: rt+1 = Π(rt + αtGˆt), where
Π(x) = arg min
z∈(0,1)
|z − x|.
end for
2. The adaptivity of gradient descent allows us to quickly converge to a local optimum and
follow this optimum if it changes over time, significantly saving on search cost (over global
methods such as grid search).
3. In practice, many revenue curves have a unique local optimum (see Section 5), so gradient
descent is likely to converge to the optimal reserve.
More specifically, since the seller has no direct access to the gradients (i.e, first-order infor-
mation) of µ(r), we consider approaches that fit in the framework of zeroth-order stochastic opti-
mization. Our framework, summarized in Algorithm 1, proceeds in rounds. In round t where the
current reserve is rt, the seller selects a perturbation size βt and randomly sets the reserve price to
either (1+βt)rt or (1−βt)rt on separate slices of experiment traffic, until it has received nt samples
from both B((1 + βt)rt) and B((1− βt)rt). The seller then uses these 2nt samples to estimate the
gradient Gˆt of the revenue curve µ(r) at rt and updates the reserve price based on this gradient
estimate using learning rate (step size) αt.
We assume that we have access to a fixed total number of samples N =
∑T
t=1 nt (the number
of iterations T is a variable that will be fixed later). There is then a trade-off between nt (i.e, the
number of samples per iteration) and T (the number of iterations available to optimize the reserve
price).
Zeroth-order stochastic gradient descent is a well-studied problem [14, 4, 13, 20]. In this paper,
we focus on taking advantage of the structure of b(r, v) to construct good discrete gradient estimates
Gˆt, as this aspect is specific to the problem of reserve price optimization. Specifically, we tackle
the following problem which we term the discrete gradient problem:
• Input: n samples X+1 , · · · , X+n drawn i.i.d from B(r+) and n samples X ,1 · · · , X−n drawn
i.i.d from B(r−), for known r+ > r−.
• Output: An estimator Gˆ for the discrete derivative (µ(r+) − µ(r−))/(r+ − r−). This
estimator has bias Bias(Gˆ) and variance Var(Gˆ), where Bias(Gˆ) =
∣∣∣E[Gˆ]− µ(r+)−µ(r−)r+−r− ∣∣∣.
Solutions to the discrete gradient problem with small bias and variance directly translate into
faster convergence rates for our gradient descent. We provide a detailed convergence result in
Theorem C.2 in Appendix C.1. We summarize this result informally as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (Informal Restatement of Theorem C.2). If for all t, Bias(Gˆt) ≤ B and Var(Gˆt) ≤ V
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then for optimal choices of αt and nt (and fixing βt = δ/2rt), Algorithm 1 satisfies
min
t∈[T ]
|PtC |2 = O˜
(
T−1/2 + δ2 +B2 + V + (T/N)2
)
.
Here PtC can be thought of as the true gradient at round t (see Definition C.1 in Appendix).
Intuitively, we want to design an estimator and choose our parameters αt, βt, nt, so as to trade
off between δ, B, and V . In the following sections, we show how to do this for a variety of bidder
response models.
Naive Gradient Estimation
The simplest method for estimating the discrete gradient is to take the difference between the
average revenue from bids from B(r+) and the average revenue from bids from B(r−). More
formally, we compute discrete gradient as,
Gˆ =
∑n
i=1X
+
i −
∑n
i=1X
−
i
n(r+ − r−) . (2)
We show that Gˆ has the following properties.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that r+ − r− = δ, then Bias(Gˆ) = 0,Var(Gˆ) ≤ 1
2δ2n
.
This leads to the following convergence rate via Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Using this estimator Gˆ, and setting T = N1/2 and δ = Θ(N−1/8), Algorithm 1
achieves convergence, mint∈[T ] |PtC |2 ≤ O˜
(
N−1/4
)
.
Although there are no matching lower bounds, this is the best known asymptotic convergence
rate for zeroth-order optimization over a non-convex objective [14, 4]. The naive gradient estimation
approach has the advantage that it works regardless of response model, is simple to compute (it
uses only revenue information and not individual bids), and leads to an unbiased estimator for the
discrete derivative. The disadvantage is that the variance of this estimator can be large (especially
as we take δ small). In the following section, we show how to address this by taking into account
the inherent structure of the revenue objective based on an underlying bidder response model.
4 Variance Reduced Gradient Estimation
In this section, we first introduce another representation of the revenue formula by decomposing it
into a demand component and a bidding component. We then propose techniques to reduce the
variance of the discrete gradient of each component.
4.1 Revenue Decomposition
We can decompose the revenue µ(r) in the following way.
Theorem 4.1. We have that
µ(r) = Ev∼F [max(b(r, v)− r, 0)] + r Pr
v∼F
[v ≥ r]. (3)
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Define E(r) = Ev∼F [max(b(r, v)− r, 0)] and D(r) = Prv∼F [v ≥ r], so that µ(r) = E(r) + rD(r).
These two terms capture two different aspects of bidder behavior which contribute to revenue. The
function D(r) amounts to a “demand curve” which gives the proportion of values that clear the
reserve r, and therefore the proportion of auctions that are bid on at r. If the auction were just
a simple posted-price auction (i.e., the winner is charged the quoted price r), then the demand
component rD(r) would be the associated revenue. However, in a first-price auction the winning
bidder pays its bid, not the reserve. Therefore the bidding component E(r) captures the excess
contribution from bids greater than the reserve.
To construct a good estimator Gˆ for the discrete gradient of µ(r), it suffices to construct good
estimators GˆE and GˆD for the discrete gradients of E(r) and rD(r) respectively, and then output
Gˆ = GˆE + GˆD. Note that Bias(Gˆ) ≤ Bias(GˆE) + Bias(GˆD) and Var(Gˆ) ≤ 2(Var(GˆD) + Var(GˆE)),
so it suffices to bound the bias and variance of each component separately.
4.2 Estimating the Demand Component Gradient
We begin by discussing how to estimate the gradient GˆD of the demand component of revenue.
One method of doing so is by estimating D(r) with a parametric function fθ(r), and using this
approximation to estimate the gradient GˆD. (See Appendix B for additional justification for why
this is likely to be possible and helpful). Suppose that we have access to additional historical data
S with which we can fit our parametric class to D(r); let θˆ be the resulting learned parameter.
This learned demand function gives rise to the following estimator GˆD:
GˆD =
r+fθˆ(r
+)− r−fθˆ(r−)
r+ − r− (4)
Note that this decreases overall variance, the variance of GˆD is 0 because the randomness of
GˆD only comes from historical samples S, which are independent of the samples obtained in the
current round, at the cost of a possible increase in bias (due to inaccuracy in estimating D(r)).
4.3 Estimating the Bidding Component Gradient
In this section we propose a variance reduction method to achieve a better estimator for GˆE for a
variety of bidder models.
Variance reduction via bid truncation. We first consider the special case of the perfect
response (and more generally, the ε-bounded response) bidding model. In the perfect response
model, if you were going to bid b > r+ when the reserve was r+, you will bid the same bid b when
the reserve is r−. This means that large bids (bids larger than r+) do not contribute in expectation
to µ(r+)− µ(r−), but they do add noise to our gradient estimation. By filtering these out, we can
reduce the variance of our estimator while keeping our estimator unbiased. Formally, we define
truncated bid Y −i as
Y −i =
{
max(X−i − r−, 0) if X−i ≤ r+
(r+ − r−) otherwise
Our estimate for the gradient of E(r) is then given by
GˆE = −
∑n
i=1 Y
−
i
n(r+ − r−) . (5)
Since any bid in an ε-bounded model only differs from one in the perfect response model by at
most ε, we can apply this same estimator to an ε-bounded response model. The following theorem
characterizes the bias and variance of the estimator for the ε-bounded response model.
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Theorem 4.2. Assume that r+− r− = δ, then the estimator GˆE in Eq. (5) for ε-bounded response
model, satisfies: Bias(GˆE) =
2ε
δ ,Var(GˆE) ≤ 14n .
Note that the bias of estimator GˆE is 0 for the perfect response model. The complete proof
is given in Appendix C.5. Combining the above results for GˆE and GˆD, we have the following
improved convergence result for the ε-bounded response model.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose Bias(GˆD) ≤ εD/δ. Using the estimator GˆE proposed in Eq. (5) for the ε-
bounded response model, setting T = N2/3 and δ = Θ(
√
ε+ εD), Algorithm 1 achieves convergence,
mint∈[T ] |PtC |2 ≤ O˜
(
ε+ εD +N
−1/3).
For perfect response bidding models, the above convergence rate is strictly faster than the con-
vergence rate of naive estimator in Corollary 3.1 (state-of-the-art convergence rate for zeroth-order
stochastic gradient descent), but with additional bias coming from demand estimation. However,
we show this bias has practically negligible effect on the revenue in our experiments.
Variance reduction via quantile truncation. In Eq. (5), we reduced the variance of GˆE by
truncating all bids at the fixed threshold of t = r+. In general, this does not quite work: for bidder
response models that are far from perfect response, this truncation can introduce a very large bias.
Here we demonstrate one technique for constructing good estimators GˆE as long as the bidding
function b(r, v) possesses diminishing sensitivity in value to reserve.
Instead of truncating in bid space, we will instead want to truncate in value space to reduce
the variance. Even though we cannot directly truncate by values, since b(r, v) is monotonically
increasing in v, quantiles of bids (e.g., of B(r+) and B(r−)) directly correspond to quantiles of
values (of F). Instead of setting a threshold t directly on the value, it is therefore equivalent to
truncate at a fixed quantile of the bid distribution.
To achieve this, we first sort X+i and X
−
i in ascending order. Then we compute GˆE as
GˆE =
∑qn
i=1 max(X
+
i − r+, 0)−
∑qn
i=1 max(X
−
i − r−, 0)
n(r+ − r−) − (1− q), (6)
where q ∈ [0, 1] is the quantile threshold used to truncate bids. The following theorem characterizes
the bias and variance of the above GˆE ,
Theorem 4.3. Let r+ − r− = δ, t = F−1(q), and t˜ = F−1(q + n−2/3). Then the estimator GˆE in
Eq. (6) satisfies, Bias(GˆE) ≤ (1−q)(b(r
+,t)−b(r−,t))
δ +O(n
−2/3),Var(GˆE) ≤ 2t˜2nδ2 +O(n−5/3δ−2).
Unlike with bid truncation, with quantile truncation we have a clear bias-variance tradeoff as we
change q: larger values of q decrease the bias (both by decreasing (1−q) and b(r+, t)−b(r−, t), which
is decreasing due to diminishing sensitivity) but lead to larger variance. Since one can estimate this
bound on the bias (by approximating b(r+, t)− b(r−, t) via Y +qn − Y −qn), it is possible to choose q to
optimize this bias-variance tradeoff as one sees fit (for example, to minimize B2 + V in Theorem
3.1). We show a convergence rate result for this quantile truncation approach in Corollary C.1 in
Appendix C.7.
5 Experiments
We evaluate the performance of our algorithms on synthetic and semi-synthetic data sets. Due to
space limitations, we present the complete experimental results in Appendix D.
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(a) Synthetic data with perfect re-
sponse.
(b) Synthetic data with equilibrium
response.
(c) Semi-synthetic data with per-
fect response.
Figure 1: Revenue as a function of round t for (a) synthetic data with perfect response, (b) synthetic data
with equilibrium response, and (c) semi-synthetic data with perfect response.
5.1 Data Generation
The data generation process consists of two parts: a base bid distribution specifying the distribution
of bids when no reserve is set, and a response model describing how a bidder with bid b would update
its bid in response to a reserve of r.
Response models. We assume that in the absence of a reserve bidders bid a constant fraction
γ of their value v (i.e., b = γv), which we refer to as linear shading. We consider linear shading
combined with perfect response and with -bounded response, which we implement by adding a
uniform [0, ] random variable to the bid. We also examine equilibrium bidding for n i.i.d. bidders
with uniformly distributed valuation [19]: b = r
n+(n−1)vn
nvn−1 .
Synthetic data. In our synthetic data sets, the (base) bid distribution is the uniform [0, 1]
distribution. We apply the perfect response model, ε-bounded response model and equilibrium
bidding model. In the simulations, we apply a constant shading factor of 0.4 for the perfect
response model and ε-bounded response model. For equilibrium bidding, we assume that each
auction contains n = 2 bidders.
Semi-synthetic data. For our semi-synthetic data sets, we separately collected the empirical
distributions of winning bids over one day for 20 large publishers on a major display ad exchange.
Each distribution was filtered for outliers and normalized to the interval [0, 1]. For this semi-
synthetic data we only test the perfect-response model and ε-bounded response model, since there
is no closed-form solution for the equilibrium bidding strategy. We use 0.3 as the constant shading
factor for semi-synthetic data.
5.2 Methodology
Gradient descent algorithms. We examine five different gradient descent algorithms: (I) Naive
GD : naive gradient descent using the gradient estimator in Eq. (2); (II) Naive GD with bid trun-
cation: gradient descent using the gradient estimator in Eq. (5) for the bidding component, and
a naive estimate4 of the demand component; (III) Naive GD with quantile truncation: gradient
descent using the gradient estimator in Eq. (6) for the bidding component, and naive estimate of
the demand component; (IV) Demand modeling with bid truncation: Same as the second variant,
but with a parametric model of the demand curve to estimate demand component of gradient;
(V) Demand modeling with quantile truncation: Same as the third variant, but with a parametric
model of the demand curve to estimate demand component of gradient. The parameters used in
these algorithms are specified in Appendix D.
4We can form a naive unbiased estimator GˆD =
Dˆ(r+)−Dˆ(r−)
r+−r− , where Dˆ(r
+) = 1
n
∑
i I{x+i ≥ r+} and similarly for
Dˆ(r−).
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Figure 2: Revenue as a function of round t for synthetic data with equilibrium response.
Demand curve estimation. To reduce variance following the ideas of Section 4, we need
a model GˆD for the demand component of the discrete gradient. Instead of estimating GˆD from
historical data, we adaptively learn the demand curve during the training process. Concretely, at
each round t, we observe new (reserve, demand) pairs from 2nt samples and retrain our demand
curve using all the samples observed up to the current round. We use this trained demand curve
to compute GˆD based on (4). For the synthetic data, a simple logistic regression can effectively
learn the demand curve. However, the semi-synthetic data required a more flexible model so for
this case we model demand using a fully connected neural network with 1 hidden layer, 15 hidden
nodes and ReLU activations.
5.3 Evaluation
Effectiveness of gradient descent. First, we confirm that gradient descent can effectively find
optimal reserves in our models. For each semi-synthetic model, we construct the revenue curve
as a function of reserve with assumed response models. We find that 19 out of the 20 revenue
curves have a clear single local maximum (the remaining curve has 2). In all cases (synthetic and
semi-synthetic models), the revenue learned by the naive gradient descent algorithm is at least 95%
of the revenue at the optimal reserve, which indicates that gradient descent can efficiently find the
optimal reserve in these cases despite the lack of convexity.
Effectiveness of variance reduction methods. We first evaluate the performance of the
quantile-based variance reduction method. We run the algorithm variants (I), (III) and (V) under
synthetic data and semi-synthetic data with multiple bidder response models. Figures (1a) and (1c)
show the revenue achieved by the three algorithms over time under the perfect response model. We
find that quantile-based variance reduction leads to a more stable training process which converges
faster than naive gradient descent. Figure (1b) evaluates the performance of the three algorithm
variants under synthetic data and an equilibrium response model, with similar conclusions. Overall,
quantile-based variance reduction outperforms naive gradient descent. Moreover, with the addition
of demand curve estimation, algorithm variant (V) achieves better revenue and converges to an
optimal reserve faster than the other two algorithms, in agreement with our theoretical guarantees.
We next consider variance reduction using bid truncation, which is used in algorithm variants
(II) and (IV). Bid truncation is tailored to perfect response and performs the best overall for
this response model, in accordance with the theoretical guarantees, but quantile truncation is
competitive and often performs as well over the semi-synthetic data (see Appendix D for a detailed
comparison). Under the equilibrium response model, bid truncation can in fact hinder the training
process and lead to a substantially suboptimal reserve price (see Figure 2). In summary, quantile-
based variance reduction coupled with a good demand-curve estimation is the method of choice to
achieve good reserve prices under a range of different bid distributions and bidder response models.
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Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions
Appendix
A From multiple bidders to a single bidder
Our auction can contain multiple bidders, each with their own value distribution Fi and bid function
bi(r, vi). But when setting reserve prices, we only care about the maximum bid; more specifically,
the distribution of maximum bid at each reserve. Thus it is useful to abstract away the set of
bidders in the auction as a single “mega-bidder” whose value is the maximum of all the bidders’
values and who always bids the maximum of all the bids.
Theorem A.1. Let F be the distribution of max(v1, v2, . . . , vm) (where each vi is independently
drawn from Fi) and let B(r) be the distribution of max(b1(r, v1), b2(r, v2), . . . , bm(r, vm)). Then
there exists a bid function b(r, v) such that the distribution of b(r, v) when v ∼ F is equal to the
distribution B(r).
Proof. If Br(b) is the CDF of B(r) and F (v) is the cdf of F , let b(r, v) = B−1r (F (v)). This guarantees
that if v ∼ F , then b(r, v) ∼ B(r).
Note that this reduction also preserves the properties of Definition 2.1. For example, if bi(r, vi) ≤
vi for every bidder i, then the induced b(r, v) also satisfies b(r, v) ≤ v.
B Demand Function Estimation
As in Section 3, it is possible to form a naive unbiased estimate of the demand component via the
estimator Dˆ(r) = 1n
∑n
i=1 I(Xi ≥ r). The variance of the resulting unbiased estimator GˆD is then
bounded by (see Theorem C.5), Var(GˆD) ≤ (r
+)2
2δ2n
.
Note that for small r, the variance guarantee here is significantly better than the variance
guarantee in Theorem 3.2. Thus, in instances where the optimal reserve is small (and hence we
mostly test small r+), combining this naive estimator with better estimators for GˆE (like the ones
we explore in the next section) can already lead to better convergence rates overall.
To obtain even better estimators, we can leverage the following two facts about the demand
function. First, the demand function only depends on the value distribution F of the bidders, and
not their specific bidding behavior. Since we expect value to be relatively stable in comparison to
bidding behavior, this means that we can reasonably use data from previous rounds to learn the
demand function and inform calculation of GˆD (whereas the naive gradient update only uses data
from the current round). Second, we expect the demand function D(r) to be simpler and more
nicely structured than the full revenue function µ(r)—for example, D(r) is weakly decreasing in
r—and therefore more amenable to parametric modeling.
C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Formal convergence rate
To show a convergence result for a non-convex problem with constraints, a measure called gradient
mapping is widely used in the literature e.g. [15, 28, 20]. We define the gradient mapping used in
this paper as follows,
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Definition C.1 (Gradient Mapping). Let f(x) be a differentiable function defined on [0, 1], C ∈
(0, 1) is a convex space, and ΠC is the projection operator defined as
ΠC(x) = arg min
z∈C
|z − x|, ∀x ∈ R. (7)
The gradient mapping PC is then defined as
PC(r, gˆ, α) := 1
α
(ΠC(r + αgˆ)− r)
where gˆ is a gradient estimate of µ(r) (can be biased), r ∈ C is the reserve and α is the learning
rate.
The gradient mapping PC can be interpreted as the projected gradient, which offers a feasible
update from the previous reserve r. Indeed, if the projection operator is the identity function, the
gradient mapping just returns the gradient.
Theorem C.2. Suppose µ(r) is L-smooth. Let Gˆt =
1
nt
∑nt
i=1 Gˆi,t be the gradient estimator at time
t, where ∀i ∈ [nt], |Gˆi,t| ≤ C almost surely. Fix αt = Θ( 1√T ), βt = δ/2rt and nt = N/T . Assume
for all t that Bias(Gˆt) ≤ B and Var(Gˆt) ≤ V . Then with probability at least 1 − δ, Algorithm 1
satisfies that
min
t∈[T ]
|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)|2
≤ O
(√
1
T
+
(
δ +B +
CT ln(2T/δ)
N
+
√
V ln(2T/δ)
)2)
.
where PC is the gradient mapping.
To prove Theorem C.2, we first show some useful inequalities summarized in Lemma C.3 and
Lemma C.4.
Lemma C.3 (Bernstein Inequality). Let G = 1n
∑n
i=1Gi be the random variable of estimation of
revenue’s gradient (Gi can be correlated), where |Gi| ≤ C almost surely, and V = Var[G]. Then,
we have ∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
Gi − E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Gi
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2C ln(2T/δ)3n +√2V ln(2T/δ)
holds with probability at least 1− δT .
Proof. By Bernstein’s inequality, we have
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
Gi − 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[Gi]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ z
)
≥ 1− 2 exp
( −z2n
2(V + Cz/3n)
)
Let 2 exp
(
−z2
2(V+Cz/3n)
)
= δT and solving for z, we have
z =
2C ln(2T/δ)
3n +
√(
2C ln(2T/δ)
3n
)2
+ 8V ln(2T/δ)
2
≤ 2C ln(2T/δ)
3n
+
√
2V ln(2T/δ) := z′
14
where the last inequality is based on the fact
√
a+ b ≤ √a+√b. Therefore, we have
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
Gi − 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[Gi]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ z′
)
≥ P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
Gi − 1
nt
n∑
i=1
E[Gi]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ z
)
≥ 1− δ
T
.
Lemma C.4. For any t ∈ [T ], we have
Gˆt · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt) ≥ |PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2
|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)− PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)| ≤ |µ′(rt)− Gˆt|
Proof. Since C is a convex space, then for any x ∈ C, z ∈ R, we have (x−ΠC(z)) · (z −ΠC(z)) ≤ 0.
Let z = rt + αtGˆt and x = rt, we have
(rt −ΠC(rt + αtGˆt)) · (rt + αtGˆt −ΠC(rt + αtGˆt)) ≤ 0,
which implies
αtGˆt(ΠC(rt + αtGˆt)− rt) ≥ |rt −ΠC(rt + αtGˆt)|2,
Thus, we have Gˆt · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt) ≥ |PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2. Again, since C is a convex space, ∀x, z ∈
R, |ΠC(x)−ΠC(z)| ≤ |x− Z|. Then we can prove the second inequality,
|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)− PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)| ≤ 1
αt
|ΠC(rt + αtµ′(rt))−ΠC(rt + αtGˆt| ≤ |µ′(rt)− Gˆt|
Proof of Theorem C.2. Denote r+t = (1 + βt)rt and r
−
t = (1− βt)rt. First we bound the bias of Gˆt
compared with µ′(rt). |µ′(rt)− Gˆt| can be decomposed as follows,∣∣∣µ′(rt)− Gˆt∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣µ′(rt)− µ(r+t )− µ(r−t )r+t − r−t
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣E[Gˆt]− µ(r+t )− µ(r−t )r+t − r−t
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣E[Gˆt]− Gˆt∣∣∣ (8)
Then we bound the three terms above separately. For the first term, we have
µ′(rt)− µ(r
+
t )− µ(r−t )
r+t − r−t
=
µ′(rt)βtrt − µ(r+t ) + µ′(rt)βtrt + µ(r−t )
r+t − r−t
By the smoothness of µ(r),∣∣µ(r+t )− µ(rt)− µ′(rt) · βtrt∣∣ ≤ L2 · β2t r2t∣∣µ(r−t )− µ(rt) + µ′(rt) · βtrt∣∣ ≤ L2 · β2t r2t ,
Thus, we get ∣∣∣∣µ′(rt)− µ(r+t )− µ(r−t )r+t − r−t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12βtrt · Lβ2t r2t = Lβtrt2
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By assumption, the second term is bounded by B. Combining Lemma C.3 in Appendix, for
any fixed t ∈ [T ],∣∣∣µ′(rt)− Gˆt∣∣∣ ≤ Lβtrt
2
+B +
2C ln(2T/δ)
3nt
+
√
V ln(2T/δ) = Bδ,t, (9)
holds with probability at least 1− δT .
The L-smoothness of revenue function µ(r) implies the following inequalities, for any t =
1, · · · , T ,
µ(rt+1)
≥ µ(rt) + µ′(rt) · (rt+1 − rt)− L
2
(rt+1 − rt)2
≥ µ(rt) + αtµ′(rt) · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)− Lα
2
t
2
|Gˆt|2
= µ(rt) + αtGˆt · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt) + αt(µ′(rt)− Gˆt) · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)− Lα
2
t
2
|Gˆt|2
≥ µ(rt) + αt|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2 + αt(µ′(rt)− Gˆt) · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)− Lα
2
t
2
|Gˆt|2
The first inequality is because |rt+1 − rt| ≤ αtGˆt and the last inequality is based on first
inequality in Lemma C.4. Rearranging the above inequalities, we have,
αt|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2 ≤ µ(rt+1)− µ(rt) + αt(Gˆt − µ′(rt)) · PC(rt, Gˆt, αt) + Lα
2
t
2
|Gˆt|2
≤ µ(rt+1)− µ(rt) + αt|Gˆt − µ
′(rt)|2
2
+
αt|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2
2
+
Lα2t
2
|Gˆt|2
(10)
The last inequality is based on Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the second statement in Lemma C.4.
Rearranging Equation (10), we have
αt|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2 ≤ 2(µ(rt+1)− µ(rt)) + αt|Gˆt − µ′(rt)|2 + Lα2t |Gˆt|2 (11)
Using Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and Lemma C.4, we can bound |PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)| in the
following way,
|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)|2 ≤ 2|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2 + 2|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)− PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2
≤ 2|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2 + 2|µ′(rt)− Gˆt|2
Then we can write down the following bound,
αt|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)|2 ≤ 2αt|PC(rt, Gˆt, αt)|2 + 2αt|µ′(rt)− Gˆt|2
≤ 4(µ(rt+1)− µ(rt)) + 4αt|Gˆt − µ′(rt)|2 + 2Lα2t |Gˆt|2
≤ 4(µ(rt+1)− µ(rt)) + 4αt|Gˆt − µ′(rt)|2 + 4Lα2t (|Gˆt − µ′(rt)|2 + |µ′(rt)|2)
(12)
Let r∗ ∈ C be the point with the minimum absolute gradient, i.e., r∗ = arg minr∈C |µ′(r)|. Notice
|µ′(rt)|2 ≤ 2|µ′(r∗)|2 + 2|µ′(r∗) − µ′(rt)| ≤ 2L + 2|µ′(r∗)|2 := L∗. Summing up the inequality (12)
from t = 1 to T , based on inequality (9) with probability at least 1− δ, we have
T∑
t=1
αt|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)|2 ≤ 4(µ(rT+1)− µ(r1)) + 4
T∑
t=1
αt|Bδ,t|2 + 4L
T∑
t=1
α2t (|Bδ,t|2 + L∗)
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Setting αt = Θ
(
1√
T
)
, βt = δ/2rt and nt = N/T , By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the fact
that
∑T
t=1 αt = Θ(
√
T ) and
∑T
t=1 α
2
t = Θ(1). Therefore, we get
min
t=1,··· ,T
|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)|2 ≤ 1∑T
t=1 αt
T∑
t=1
αt|PC(rt, µ′(rt), αt)|2
≤ O
(√
1
T
+
(
δ +B +
CT ln(2T/δ)
N
+
√
V ln(2T/δ)
)2)
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Since X+i and X
−
i are independent random samples from Br+ and Br− respectively, E[Gˆ] =
µ(r+)−µ(r−)
r+−r− . For the variance, since X
+
i is bounded by [0, 1], then the variance of each X
+
i and X
−
i
is at most 1/4, which implies,
Var(Gˆ) ≤ 2
4δ2n
=
1
2δ2n
C.3 Variance bounds for GˆD
In this subsection we bound the variance of the unbiased demand estimator
GˆD =
r+
∑n
i=1 I(X
+
i ≥ r+)− r+
∑n
i=1 I(X
+
i ≥ r+)
n(r+ − r−) .
Since E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(X
+
i ≥ r+)
]
= D(r+) and E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(X
−
i ≥ r−)
]
= D(r−), it follows imme-
diately that
E[GˆD] =
r+D(r+)− r−D(r−)
r+ − r−
and therefore that Bias(GˆD) = 0. In the following theorem, we bound Var(GˆD).
Theorem C.5. Let δ = r+ − r−. We have that
Var(GˆD) ≤ (r
+)2
2nδ2
.
Proof. Since the X+i and X
−
i are independent random variables, their variances are additive so
Var(GˆD) =
1
n2δ2
(
n(r+)2Var(I(X+i ≥ r+)) + n(r−)2Var(I(X−i ≥ r−))
)
≤ (r
+)2
2nδ2
,
where in the last line we have used the fact that the variance of a Bernoulli random variable is
bounded above by 1/4.
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C.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Note that
µ(r) = Ev∼F [b(r, v)]
= Ev∼F [max(b(r, v), r)− rI{b(r, v) = 0}]
= Ev∼F [max(b(r, v), r)]− rEv∼F [I{b(r, v) = 0}]
= Ev∼F [max(b(r, v), r)]− r Pr
v∼F
[v < r]
= Ev∼F [max(b(r, v), r)]− r(1− Pr
v∼F
[v ≥ r])
= Ev∼F [max(b(r, v), r)− r] + r Pr
v∼F
[v ≥ r])
C.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2
In the following proof we slightly abuse notation, by denoting Br to be the CDF of the bid dis-
tribution w.r.t reserve price r. We also formally state the definition of ε-bounded response model
here.
Definition C.6 (ε-bounded response model). A ε-bounded response bidding function takes the
form,
b(r, v) =

b(0, v) if b(0, v) ≥ r
r + z if b(0, v) ≤ r ≤ v
0 if v < r
where z ∈ [0, ε], and z can be a random variable.
Proof. To bound the variance, note that each Y −i is constrained to the interval [0, r
+ − r−]. Since
this interval has length at most δ, the variance of each Y −i is at most (δ
2/4), then
Var(GˆE) ≤ n(δ
2/4)
n2δ2
≤ 1
4n
.
Then we focus on bounding the bias,
Ev
[
max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0)]
=
∫ 1
0
max(b, r+)dBr+ −
∫ 1
0
max(b, r−))dBr− − (r+ − r−)
=
∫ r++ε
0
max(b, r+)dBr+ −
∫ r++ε
0
max(b, r−)dBr− +
∫ 1
r++ε
max(b, r+)dBr+ −
∫ 1
r++ε
max(b, r−)dBr−
−(r+ − r−)
=
∫ r+
0
max(b, r+)dBr+ −
∫ r+
0
max(b, r−)dBr− +
∫ r++ε
r+
max(b, r+)dBr+ −
∫ r++ε
r+
max(b, r−)dBr−
−(r+ − r−)
= r+Br+(r+)−
∫ r+
0
max(b, r−)dBr− − (r+ − r−) +
∫ r++ε
r+
bdBr+ −
∫ r++ε
r+
bdBr−
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Here the third equality holds because the fact that if b > r+ + ε,Br+(b) = Br−(b) by property
of the ε-bounded response. The fourth equality is based on max(b(r+, v), r+) = r+ when v ≤ r+
and F(r+) = Br+(r+). Then we consider E[Y −i ], where
E[Y −i ] = E[max(X
−
i − r−, 0)I{X−i ≤ r+}] + E[(r+ − r−)I{X−i > r+}]
=
∫ r+
0
max(b, r−)dBr− + r+(1− Br−(r+))− r−
Before bounding the bias of GˆE , we state some useful equations based on integral by part.∫ r++ε
r+
bdBr+ = (r+ + ε)Br+(r+ + ε)− r+Br+(r+)−
∫ r++ε
r+
Br+(b)db (13)∫ r++ε
r+
bdBr− = (r+ + ε)Br−(r+ + ε)− r+Br−(r+)−
∫ r++ε
r+
Br−(b)db (14)
Based on definition of ε-bounded response, Br−(r+ + ε) = Br+(r+ + ε). Then we have
∣∣∣∣E[GˆE ]− E(r+)− E(r−)r+ − r−
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣− E[Y −i ]r+ − r− − E(r+)− E(r−)r+ − r−
∣∣∣∣
=
1
r+ − r−
∣∣∣∣∣r+Br+(r+)− r+Br−(r+) +
∫ r++ε
r+
bdBr+ −
∫ r++ε
r+
bdBr−
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
r+ − r−
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ r++ε
r+
Br+(b)db−
∫ r++ε
r+
Br−(b)db
∣∣∣∣∣
(Based on Equations (13) and (14) as well as Br−(r+ + ε) = Br+(r+ + ε))
≤ 2ε
r+ − r−
where the inequality is because ∀b ∈ [r+, r+ + ε],Br+(b),Br−(b) ≤ 1.
C.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We start with the following helpful auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma C.7. Let Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn be n iid uniform random variables. Let Y
(k) be the kth largest Yi.
Then with probability at least 1− n−2/3,∣∣∣∣Y (k) − kn+ 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ n−2/3.
Proof. From the theory of order statistics [12], we know that Y (k) ∼ Beta(k, n + 1 − k). It is
known that E[Y (k)] = kn+1 and that Var(Y
k) ≤ 1/(8n). The statement immediately follows from
Chebyshev’s inequality.
19
Lemma C.8. Let f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be an increasing function and let Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn be n iid uniform
random variables. Let Xi = f(Yi), and let Sk be the r.v. equal to the sum of the k smallest Xi.
Then ∣∣∣∣ 1nE[Sqn]−
∫ q
0
f(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3n−2/3
Proof. Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zqn be (a random permutation) of the qn smallest Yi (so Sk =
∑
f(Zi)).
Note that conditioned on Zqn+1 = r, the Zi are independently distributed according to U([0, r]).
In particular, we have that
1
n
E[Sqn|Zqn+1 = r] =
∫ r
0
f(x)dx.
From Lemma C.7, we know that with probability at least 1 − n−2/3, Zqn+1 ∈ [q − 2n−2/3, q +
2n−2/3]. Since f(x) ∈ [0, 1], it follows that ∫ r0 f(x)dx is 1-Lipshitz and therefore (conditioned on
Zqn+1 ∈ [q − 2n−2/3, q + 2n−2/3]),∣∣∣∣∫ q
0
f(x)dx−
∫ Zqn+1
0
f(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2n−2/3.
On the other hand, in the (n−2/3 probability) case where Zqn+1 /∈ [q − 2n−2/3, q + 2n−2/3],
1
nE[Sqn] is still bounded in [0, 1]. The theorem statement immediately follows.
Lemma C.9. Let Xi be an iid collection of n rvs. Let X
(k) be the kth smallest of the Xi (so
X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ · · · ≤ X(n)). Then, if Sk =
∑k
i=1X
(i), we have that
Var(Sk) ≤ nE[(X(k))2].
Proof. The Efron-Stein inequalities (see Theorem 2 of [8]) state that for any collection of n random
variables Xi and any measurable functions f : Rn → R and fi : Rn−1 → R we have that
Var(f(X)) ≤
n∑
i=1
E[(f(X)− fi(X−i))2],
where X−i is the (n− 1)-tuple of rvs (X1, X2, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn).
Let f(X) equal the sum of the k smallest entries in X, and let fi(X
′) equal the sum of the k−1
smallest entries in X ′. Note that for this choice of f and fi, f(X) = Sk, and 0 ≤ f(X)− fi(X−i) ≤
X(k) (since the k− 1 smallest entries in X−i are a subset of the k smallest entries in X). It follows
that Var(Sk) ≤ nE[(X(k))2], as desired.
We can now proceed to prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We begin by bounding the variance of our estimator GˆE . Let us begin by
focusing on Var(
∑qn
i=1 Y
−
i ). Since these Yi are sorted, Lemma C.9 implies that Var(
∑qn
i=1 Y
−
i ) ≤
nE[(Y −qn)2]. Since t˜ = F−1(q + n−2/3), by Lemma C.7, with probability at least 1− n−2/3, Y −qn ≤ t˜,
and therefore Var(
∑qn
i=1 Y
−
i ) ≤ nt˜2 +n1/3. Similarly, Var(
∑qn
i=1 Y
+
i ) ≤ nt˜2 +n1/3. Since the sets of
rvs Y −i and Y
+
i are independent, we have that
Var(GˆE) ≤ 2t˜
2
nδ2
+O(n−5/3δ−2).
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We now proceed to bound the bias of GˆE . First, note that by Lemma C.8, we have that∣∣∣∣∣ 1nE
[
qn∑
i=1
Y −qn
]
−
∫ q
0
max(b(r−,F−1(x))− r−, 0)dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3n−2/3,
and therefore ∣∣∣∣∣ 1nE
[
qn∑
i=1
Y −qn
]
−
∫ t
0
max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0)dF(v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3n−2/3.
Likewise ∣∣∣∣∣ 1nE
[
qn∑
i=1
Y +qn
]
−
∫ t
0
max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)dF(v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3n−2/3.
It follows that
∣∣∣∣GˆE − (1δ
∫ t
0
(max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0))dF(v)− (1− q)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 6n−2/3. (15)
On the other hand, note that
E(r+)− E(r−) =
∫ 1
0
(max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0))dF(v)
=
∫ t
0
(max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0))dF(v)
+
∫ 1
t
(max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0))dF(v).
Now, note that for v ≥ r+, max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0) = b(r+, v)− b(r−, v)−
(r+ − r−). Since Pr[v ≥ t] = 1− q, it follows that
∫ 1
t
(max(b(r+, v)− r+, 0)−max(b(r−, v)− r−, 0))dF(v)
=
∫ 1
t
(b(r+, v)− b(r−, v)− (r+ − r−))dF(v)
=
∫ 1
t
(b(r+, v)− b(r−, v))dF(v)− (1− q)(r+ − r−)
∈ [−(1− q)δ,−(1− q)δ + (b(r+, t)− b(r−, t))(1− q)] .
Here the last line follows since b(r+, v)−b(r−, v) is decreasing in v (due to diminishing sensitivity
to reserve) but always non-negative. Combining this with equation 15, we have that:∣∣∣∣GˆE − 1δ (E(r+)− E(r−))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (b(r+, t)− b(r−, t))(1− q)δ + 6n−2/3,
as desired.
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C.7 Convergence Rate of Quantile Truncation
Corollary C.1. Suppose Bias(GˆD) ≤ εD/δ. Using the estimator GˆE proposed in Eq. (5) for the
response model with diminishing sensitivity property, for any fixed quantile q, setting T = N2/3 and
δ = Θ(
√
εD + 1− q), Algorithm 1 achieves convergence,
min
t∈[T ]
|PtC |2 ≤ O˜
(
εD + 1− q +
(
1 +
F−1(q +N−2/9)
εD + 1− q
)
·N−1/3
)
D Additional Experiments
In this section, we show the parameters used in the algorithms and some additional experiments.
For additional experiments, we compare the two truncation methods for perfect response models,
and then we show the complete results of 20 semi-synthetic data sets with perfect response. Finally,
we test for other different response models in synthetic data and one of the semi-synthetic data sets
(the first data set). In addition to the figures about the revenue curve learned by our algorithms,
we also report the average revenue of the first several rounds learned by our algorithms in Tables
(see Table 1, 2, and 3).
Set up. For all the algorithms, we set the learning rate to 0.05, the minimum reserve price
to 0.1, the maximum reserve price to 5.0, and the perturbation size to βt = 0.1 at each round.
For quantile truncation, we use the 80% quantile as the threshold to discard bids. We run the
algorithms for 200 rounds with access to 100 samples at each round (50 for r− and 50 for r+),
which forms 1 trial. We repeat 50 trials for each algorithm and report the mean (solid line) and
95% confidence interval (translucent and colored area) of the revenue achieved during training for
each algorithms shown in the figures. To obtain revenue curves learned by the algorithms over
time, the revenue at each point is estimated through 10,000 bids randomly drawn from the bid
distribution and bidder response model.
Comparison of bid truncation and quantile truncation for perfect response models.
We show the average revenue achieved by algorithms with bid truncation and quantile truncation
for synthetic data with perfect response in Table 1 (first 50th rounds) and semi-synthetic data with
perfect response in Table 2 (first 20th rounds) and Table 3 (first 50th rounds). We show that the
bid truncation (Algorithm (IV)) performs the best in most of cases, but quantile truncation (Al-
gorithm (V)) is also competitive and performs well for perfect response in both synthetic data and
semi-synthetic data sets. Bid truncation doesn’t significantly outperform than quantile truncation
significantly, since the algorithms only take small number of the samples at each round and the
quantile truncation is more stable in this setting.
Performance of all 20 semi-synthetic data sets with perfect response. We evaluate
the performance of five algorithms for 20 semi-synthetic data sets with perfect response. Here we
still repeat 50 trials for each algorithm and report the mean and 95% confidence interval of the
revenue. The results are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3, where each table records the average
revenue over the first 20 rounds and 50 rounds, respectively. The revenue is normalized by the
optimal revenue of each data set (empirically evaluated by grid search). We find in semi-synthetic
data, the variance reduction methods (bid truncation and quantile truncation) improve the revenue
achieved by the algorithms. Interestingly, we find Naive gradient descent with bid truncation also
works well in several semi-synthetic data sets, this is because our demand modeling approach relies
on a good estimator GˆD and sometimes, the simple neural network cannot learn the demand curve
very accurately in the beginning.
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(a) Synthetic data with no response (b) Semi-synthetic data with no response
Figure 3: Plots of reserve price as a function of round t for (a) synthetic data with no response, and (b)
one semi-synthetic data with no response.
No response model. In no response model, bidders don’t change their bids based on reserve
prices, i.e ∀r > 0, r ≥ 0,Br(r′) = B0(r′). This can be regarded as a perfect response model with
linear shading factor 1. In this case, we expect the algorithms converge to the lower bound of the
reserve prices 0.1. For no response models, we set perturbation be 0.3 to speed up convergence
and we still use logistic regression to learn demand curve. Figure 3 shows that all the algorithms
almost converge to minimum reserve price 0.1 and the bid truncation method works the best for
no response model.
Mixture of no response and perfect response models. We also consider another non-
perfect response model, which is a mixture of perfect response and no response models. We assume
the bidder will not respond to reserve price with probability 0.1 and use perfect response with
probability 0.9. Figure 4 shows the revenue curve learned by the algorithms for synthetic data
and one semi-synthetic data. We find quantile-based variance reduction speed up the training and
converges to optimal reserve faster than naive gradient descent. Since this is a mixture of perfect
response and no response model, the revenue achieved by bid truncation methods is worse than the
quantile-based approach. Through this experiments, we find quantile truncation is not sensitive
with different response models, whereas, the bid truncation method is very sensitive to a slightly
non-perfect response model.
ε-bounded response. In the experiments for ε-bounded response model, we set ε = 0.05 and
the bias term z ∼ Unif[0, ε] in ε-bounded response model (see definition C.6). We visualize the
revenue learned by algorithms for synthetic data and semi-synthetic data in Figure 5. The figures
show that for ε-bounded response, the quantile truncation still works better than naive gradient
descent. Since we have demonstrated that bid truncation is sensitive to non-perfect response model,
the performance of the bid truncation is worse than quantile truncation in ε-bounded response.
Response model
Algorithm (I) Algorithm (II) Algorithm (III) Algorithm (IV) Algorithm (V)
rev rev rev rev rev
Perfect response 86.7± 0.8% 86.5± 0.7% 87.1± 0.9% 88.9± 0.3% 89.4± 0.6%
Equilibrium response 95.5± 0.5% 90.1± 0.2% 96.3± 0.4% 93.5± 0.6% 96.4± 0.4%
ε-bounded response 86.4± 0.8% 83.0± 0.6% 86.6± 1.0% 85.1± 0.8% 87.1± 0.8%
Mixture response 90.5± 0.3% 90.3± 0.3% 90.8± 0.4% 90.8± 0.3% 91.0± 0.4%
Table 1: Average revenue of the first 50th rounds of five algorithms for synthetic data with different response
models. The revenue is normalized by the optimal revenue and we repeat 50 trials for each algorithm to
report the 95% confidence interval.
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(a) Synthetic data with mixture response (b) Semi-synthetic data with mixture response
Figure 4: Plots of reserve price and revenue as a function of round t for (a) synthetic data and (b) one
semi-synthetic data, with mixture response, where the bidder uses perfect response model with probability
0.9 and doesn’t respond to the reserve, otherwise.
(a) Synthetic data with ε-bounded response (b) Semi-synthetic data with ε-bounded response
Figure 5: Plots of revenue as a function of round t for (a) synthetic data with ε-bounded response, and (b)
one semi-synthetic data with ε-bounded response, where ε = 0.05 and the bias term z ∼ Unif[0, ε].
Semi-synthetic data sets
Algorithm (I) Algorithm (II) Algorithm (III) Algorithm (IV) Algorithm (V)
rev rev rev rev rev
(1) 73.9± 0.4% 73.8± 0.2% 74.1± 0.4% 75.3± 0.1% 75.3± 0.3%
(2) 91.8± 0.8% 92.9± 0.3% 92.9± 0.6% 94.5± 0.1% 94.3± 0.6%
(3) 94.1± 0.2% 94.7± 0.2% 93.5± 0.3% 94.4± 0.1% 93.3± 0.3%
(4) 82.9± 0.4% 83.4± 0.0% 82.9± 0.3% 83.5± 0.0% 83.2± 0.2%
(5) 93.0± 0.6% 94.8± 0.0% 93.4± 0.4% 94.4± 0.0% 93.9± 0.4%
(6) 93.8± 0.7% 91.8± 0.5% 94.0± 0.6% 95.6± 0.1% 95.9± 0.4%
(7) 86.4± 0.4% 85.1± 0.4% 87.4± 0.5% 87.9± 0.1% 88.6± 0.5%
(8) 95.0± 0.7% 96.0± 0.2% 95.3± 0.6% 96.7± 0.1% 95.6± 0.3%
(9) 83.6± 1.0% 84.0± 0.5% 84.9± 0.9% 89.1± 0.1% 88.6± 1.1%
(10) 94.3± 0.8% 94.8± 0.3% 94.9± 0.8% 96.4± 0.0% 95.9± 0.5%
(11) 52.0± 1.1% 53.1± 1.0% 52.2± 1.6% 52.1± 1.0% 51.2± 1.6%
(12) 86.6± 0.7% 86.9± 0.3% 87.9± 0.7% 89.8± 0.1% 89.6± 0.5%
(13) 89.7± 1.5% 89.8± 0.8% 89.1± 1.5% 92.1± 0.1% 91.2± 1.0%
(14) 93.3± 0.6% 93.0± 0.4% 93.1± 0.7% 95.7± 0.1% 95.2± 0.7%
(15) 96.2± 0.7% 95.0± 0.5% 96.3± 0.7% 97.9± 0.1% 97.8± 0.3%
(16) 88.4± 0.8% 87.8± 0.4% 88.6± 0.8% 92.0± 0.1% 92.1± 0.7%
(17) 94.6± 0.6% 94.9± 0.1% 93.9± 0.7% 92.5± 0.1% 91.6± 0.6%
(18) 91.0± 0.6% 90.9± 0.3% 90.8± 0.6% 93.0± 0.1% 92.7± 0.4%
(19) 83.4± 0.6% 83.4± 0.4% 84.7± 0.6% 85.9± 0.1% 85.8± 0.6%
(20) 94.7± 0.9% 97.3± 0.1% 95.6± 0.7% 93.9± 0.1% 92.2± 0.4%
Table 2: Average revenue of first 20th rounds of five algorithms for semi-synthetic data sets with perfect
response. The revenue is normalized by the optimal revenue of each data set. We repeat 50 trials to get the
95% confidence interval.
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Semi-synthetic data sets
Algorithm (I) Algorithm (II) Algorithm (III) Algorithm (IV) Algorithm (V)
rev rev rev rev rev
(1) 75.1± 0.6% 74.5± 0.3% 75.7± 0.6% 76.8± 0.2% 77.5± 0.7%
(2) 93.4± 0.5% 94.1± 0.2% 94.4± 0.4% 94.8± 0.1% 95.4± 0.4%
(3) 93.9± 0.2% 95.0± 0.1% 93.3± 0.2% 94.9± 0.1% 93.4± 0.3%
(4) 83.3± 0.3% 83.7± 0.0% 83.3± 0.3% 83.9± 0.0% 83.7± 0.1%
(5) 95.7± 0.3% 96.8± 0.0% 95.9± 0.2% 96.4± 0.0% 96.3± 0.2%
(6) 95.2± 0.4% 93.7± 0.5% 95.4± 0.4% 96.6± 0.0% 96.6± 0.2%
(7) 88.8± 0.5% 87.1± 0.5% 90.0± 0.6% 90.0± 0.1% 91.1± 0.4%
(8) 97.3± 0.3% 98.1± 0.1% 97.0± 0.4% 98.7± 0.1% 97.4± 0.2%
(9) 91.5± 0.8% 91.9± 0.6% 92.8± 0.8% 95.6± 0.1% 95.3± 0.7%
(10) 96.4± 0.5% 97.0± 0.2% 96.9± 0.4% 97.7± 0.0% 97.4± 0.2%
(11) 74.4± 0.7% 75.1± 0.6% 73.3± 2.3% 75.6± 0.7% 73.5± 2.6%
(12) 89.2± 0.6% 89.3± 0.3% 90.5± 0.6% 91.6± 0.1% 91.9± 0.4%
(13) 95.6± 0.7% 96.0± 0.3% 94.8± 0.9% 96.0± 0.1% 94.8± 0.3%
(14) 94.3± 0.5% 94.2± 0.3% 94.6± 0.5% 96.1± 0.1% 96.1± 0.5%
(15) 97.4± 0.5% 97.0± 0.3% 97.4± 0.3% 99.1± 0.0% 98.3± 0.1%
(16) 91.8± 0.7% 90.4± 0.5% 92.2± 0.8% 93.9± 0.2% 94.7± 0.5%
(17) 96.9± 0.2% 97.3± 0.1% 96.3± 0.3% 94.1± 0.0% 93.7± 0.2%
(18) 92.1± 0.4% 92.0± 0.2% 92.5± 0.5% 93.5± 0.1% 93.6± 0.3%
(19) 84.7± 0.6% 84.5± 0.5% 86.1± 0.6% 87.2± 0.1% 87.4± 0.5%
(20) 97.0± 0.5% 99.3± 0.1% 96.9± 0.6% 97.1± 0.1% 95.1± 0.2%
Table 3: Average revenue of first 50th rounds of five algorithms for semi-synthetic data sets with perfect
response. The revenue is normalized by the optimal revenue of each data set. We repeat 50 trials to get the
95% confidence interval.
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